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For the last four decades, some form of "process" theory has dominated
conventional constitutional theory, on the bench and in the academy. The
organizing, usually implicit, background assumption is that the exercise of
governmental power-whether by legislatures or courts-is to be tested for
normative legitimacy against a set of procedures. Writing as critics of the basic
framework of process theory, Professors Kimberli Crenshaw and Gary Peller
discuss the contributions and constraints of a proceduralistconstitutional law
discourse. In light of direct democracy initiatives claiming the power of legislation, and a substantively conservative judiciary defining the "law," Professors
Crenshaw and Peller suggest focusing on new ways that claims of the disempowered are articulatedin constitutionaldoctrine.
* Professor of Law, Columbia University Law School and University of California at Los
Angeles School of Law.
** Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center. The authors wish to acknowledge the extraordinary research assistance of Sandra Hanna in preparing this Essay.
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INTRODUCTION

This is an essay in honor of. the late Professor Julian Eule. We take
as our point of departure his work on the appropriate judicial scrutiny of
direct democracy initiatives.' Particularly given the recent strategies of
right-wing activists to use ballot measures to reverse the meager legislative
victories that the targets of their hostility have managed to win, it is
important how progressives articulate and develop ways of understanding

these phenomena that challenge their surface appeal as exemplars of
popular self-determination.
In our view, Professor Eule's scholarship on direct democracy demonstrates the progressive possibilities of the process-oriented approach to constitutional law. He articulated a powerful case for careful review of voter
initiatives and referenda despite their apparently unquestionable
"democratic"- pedigree when viewed within the terms of other constitutional theories that base their justifications for judicial review on the
limited democratic character of the "legislature." In a skillful weave of
"republican" concerns about the dangers of majoritarian factionalism
together with "democratic" aspirations for popular sovereignty, he has
effectively impugned the tendency to identify the quality of democratic
self-determination with the quantity of votes aggregated in televised election night rituals. At a historical moment when progressive political
movements are in retreat, Eule's idea of analogizing judicial review of direct
democracy initiatives to the deliberative check on short-sighted popular
passions-supposedly underlying the American system of checks and balances on legislation-is an important counter to the intuition that popular
iniiatvesar
mot democratic
emoratc
initiatives are the
most
th
means
choose social poli . 2 And,
ean to
tochosesocalpolicies.
at a doctrinal level, the suggestion that restrictive Supreme Court interpretations of minority rights need not bind a court reviewing popular
initiatives may, ironically, provide a practical, argumentative guide for
courts and lawyers running out of ways to contain conservative Supreme
Court precedent. In short, Eule showed that, in the hands of a skilled
practitioner, a proceduralist analytic can rise to the challenge of defending
hard-fought legal victories from being overturned by direct popular action.
At the same time, we believe that Eule's challenge to the presumptive constitutionality of initiatives also reveals the limits of proceduralist
1. See Julian N. Eule, Judicial Review of Direct Democracy, 99 YALE L.J. 1503 (1990).
2. See id. at 1522-26.
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approaches in comprehending the actual relations of social power existing
beyond the theoretical models of democratic theory. As we see it, processoriented approaches to constitutional law are analytically flawed and ideologically conservative. The common analytic flaw is a formalist solution
to the issue of how to identify the sites of social power. The ideological tilt
is more loosely manifest in the construction of a discourse that drains our
dreams of democratic empowerment and human liberation of their vitality
and immediacy, and translates them into a legitimating apologia for the
mainstream ways our social life is organized.
The cultural link between the analytic and the ideological is loosely
captured in the late twentieth-century idea of being "processed into obscurity," of having movements of resistance and transformation within mainstream "enlightened" institutions inevitably met with the appointment
of a committee to study any issue raised, or the referral of the workplace fight from the shop floor to the grievance procedures of the collective
bargaining agreement. Reason meets passion with a perfectly sensible resolution according to the institutionalized procedures for resolving questions
of that kind.3 We are, in general, against these ways of disciplining through
diffusion and the bureaucratization of popular attempts at political
agitation. We believe that the problem with right-wing initiatives like
California's Proposition 209, banning race and gender affirmative action,
or Colorado's Amendment 2, prohibiting legislative protection against
discrimination according to sexual orientation, is not that they reflect
passionate, shortsighted, or irrational mob action that deliberation should
diffuse and discipline. Rather, the cultural and political dynamics reflected
in the open hostility of these initiatives against Blacks, Asians, Latinos,
Indians, and sexual minorities are not accounted for in structural, formal
designations of the dangers of popular initiative and the virtues of the
deliberative method.
In our view, only an empty formalism can prevent mainstream theories of judicial review from recognizing -the inconsistencies between talk
of "democracy" and "self-determination" on the one hand, and on the
other hand the everyday experience most of us have in most of the hours of
our lives. Similarly, limited ideas about what democracy might mean do
3. Hart and Sacks have asserted that in complex societies "[djifferent procedures and personnel of different qualifications invariably prove to be appropriate for deciding different kinds of
questions." HENRY M. HART, JR. & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS
IN THE MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW 4 (tentative ed. 1958).
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not do justice to the history of struggle, passion, solidarity, betrayal, and
fear that characterize liberatory drives to achieve democratic selfdetermination in workplaces, neighborhoods, schools, streets, and other
places of social interaction. Mainstream constitutional theories-whether
of the liberal or republican variety-pretend that a meaningful form of
democracy exists as the backdrop to the occasional and exceptional
intervention of law as symbolized by judicial review. We do not think that
constitutional discourse should be constructed to represent as democratically chosen the terms and conditions of social life that actually embody
the disempowerment of people.
While there is no analytical barrier preventing an application of process theory to constitutional law from constituting a radical critique of the
undemocratic character of our everyday social lives, there are historically
explicable reasons why process theory has never developed this radical
potential. In Part I, we summarize Eule's work on direct democracy and
situate it within the process theory analytic. In Part II, we discuss how
process theory's status as the centrist constitutional theory of our time
depends on the suppression of the analytic contradictions underlying
the process approach. We develop these contradictions by considering the
development of the equal protection doctrine and the Supreme Court's
resolution of challenges to several direct democracy initiatives. In Part III,
we consider the strategic and ideological consequences of the process
rhetoric. We conclude that, despite the best liberal intentions of scholars
like Eule, proceduralist ideology, even at its best, is a conservative and
apologetic way to think and talk about the social world.
I.

A.

THE PROCEDURALIST GENRE OF CONTEMPORARY
CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY

Eule's Argument for Increased Judicial Scrutiny
of Popular Initiatives

In Judicial Review of Direct Democracy, Eule carefully and meticulously
makes the case that judicial review should be less restrained, i.e., more
activist, when confronting popular initiative as compared to legislative
action.4 Against the superficial appeal of the notion that the direct
democracy process is presumptively more legitimate because it represents
more clearly the will of the people themselves than the imperfect leg4. See Eule, supra note 1, 1558-60.
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islative representation of popular will, Eule contends that the legislative
process contains important safeguards against factionalism that are lacking
inthe process of popular initiative.5
In arguing for stricter judicial scrutiny of popular initiatives, Eule first
asserts that the low voter turnout and the lessened voter comprehension of
ballot measures call for skepticism as to whether the election results even
measure majority will. 6 He also contends that the binary, yes/no structure
of measuring voter preferences intrinsic to the ballot-measure form falsely
rigidify the political choices available Ultimately, however, even if the
plebescite were a better way to measure majority will than legislative
results, he argues that the Constitution should be read to favor legislation.
In Eule's view, legislation is preferable to ballot initiatives precisely
because it incorporates protections against majoritarian factionalism absent
from popular initiative. The legislative process of deliberation and the
checks and balances of the constitutionally prescribed separation of powers
work to filter raw majority preferences. These processes are lacking in the
ballot initiative process unless, as Eule advocates, courts in a judicial
review capacity compensate for the lack of filtering by a greater level of
scrutiny than that applied to legislation. Eule argues that understanding
the problem of judicial review as the counter-majoritarian difficulty fails to
take account of all the ways that the constitutional structure filters majoritarianism even without judicial review.8 Once those filters are properly
accounted for, the case for increased scrutiny of ballot measures becomes
clear: Through heightened judicial scrutiny, the judiciary would provide a
filtering of majority preferences akin to legislative deliberation and the
checks and balances incorporated in the process of legislative enactment.
The content of the increased scrutiny, according to Eule, should be
an even greater vigilance in protecting the interests of disempowered
9
minorities; for example, he suggests that the Washington v. Davis requirement that a discriminatory purpose or motive be shown to make out a
claim of illegal racial discrimination under the Equal Protection Clause
0
should be relaxed when popular initiatives are under review.' The difficulty of evaluating voter motivation, and the need for more careful
scrutiny, combine to suggest lowering the barrier to judicial intervention.
5. See id. at 1548-50.
6. See id. at 1513-17.
7. Seeid. at 1517.
at 1522-26.
8. See id.
9. 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
10. "The search for a bigoted decision-maker [and thus 'racially discriminatory purpose']
seems particularly elusive in the context of substitutive plebiscites." Eule, supra note 1,at 1561.
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The Proceduralist Constitutional Tradition

As we use the term, "process-oriented" approaches to constitutional
law describe a discourse that first achieved dominance in the post-World
War II period and continues to define conventional constitutional debate
in the academy and on the bench. The shared characteristics of these
theories are their focus on the institutional conflict presented by the power
of judicial review of legislation recognized in Marbury v. Madison," and
their assumption that the proper scope of judicial review could be neutrally
identified by evaluating, independent of the substance of any law, the
respective institutional competence and converse structural limitations of
courts and legislatures. Process theory in constitutional law reflects the
idea-shared in the more general legal process jurisprudence-that legal
justice consists of the correlation of dispute resolution procedures with the
kinds of conflicts to which they are best suited, for example, administrative
agencies are good for resolving some kinds of social issues, state governmental processes are best for other issues, democratic voting prevails for
still other issues, and so forth. In the constitutional arena, the attention is
on the relative suitability of courts and legislatures for different kinds
of issues. Focusing on the counter-majoritarian difficulty with judicial
review, the inability of the judiciary forcibly to enforce its judgments, and
the array of institutional options available to the judiciary, Alexander
Bickel emphasized judicial options of deciding and avoiding decisions-the
"passive virtues."' 2 Herbert Wechsler identified the particular institutional
competence of judicial review with the procedure of ruling based on
"neutral principles," and decried the Court's decisions in cases like Brown
v. Board of Education" given that controversial value judgments were
involved. 4 John Hart Ely developed a blueprint for judicial activism that
would be "representation-reinforcing" and attempted thereby to sidestep
the charge of being counter-majoritarian.1 5 In our lexicon, they all are
process theorists because they concentrate on developing constitutional
11.

5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).

12. The phrase "counter-majoritarian difficulty" was first
used by Alexander Bickel. See A.
BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH:
TICS (1962).

THE SUPREME COURT AT THE BAR OF POLI-

13. 349 U.S. 294 (1955).
14. Herbert Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of ConstitutionalLaw, 73 HARV. L. REV. 1
(1959).
15.

(1980).

JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW
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theories concerned with the interrelation between the judiciary and the
legislature rather than the content of just laws.
At this general level, Eule should be recognizable as a proceduralist:
His background assumption is that the different characteristics of various
lawmaking institutions themselves suggest the appropriate level of judicial
review, wholly apart from the substance of the laws enacted; in Eule's
description, it is the different characteristics of the process of popular initiatives that should trigger a more interventionist judicial review, regardless
of and prior to consideration of their content. Like Bickel and Wechsler,
Eule focuses on the structural procedures of popular initiative as compared
to legislation to identify the appropriate level of judicial review. And like
Ely, Eule articulates a scheme that seeks to infer, from the very structure of
majoritarianism, reasons not to defer automatically to institutions that are
democratic only in form.
The Realist Predicate to the Rise of Proceduralism

C.

As a matter of intellectual genealogy, the focus on process that we
have briefly described can be traced to the legal realist critique of the
"formalist" constitutionalism of the "liberty of contract" era." Process theory, in constitutional discourse and in American law more generally, arose
in the vacuum created by the legal realist demonstration that "law is
politics."
In terms of constitutional doctrine, the realist argument was posed
against the turn of the century libertarian constitutional theory of cases
like Lochner v. New York. 7 In Lochner, the Court struck down ameliorative
labor legislation fixing maximum hours that bakery employees could work
on the ground that such laws abridged the freedom of the bakery owner and
the employee to choose the terms of their relations free from governmental coercion. As we see it, the liberty of contract approach was the last
period of American constitutional history in which the Constitution was
interpreted with explicit reference to a substantive theory of justice and
human freedom, an approach more or less recognizable as a form of legal
libertarianism.' 8
16. For an in-depth exploration of the rise of the process-oriented approach to constitutional law, see Gary Pellet, Neutral Principlesin the 1950s, 21 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 561 (1988).
What follows here is intended as a brief summary.

17.

198 U.S. 45, 64 (1905) (striking down maximum hour legislation as violating right

freely to contract as implicit in the constitutional language of due process).
18. It is true that the liberty of contract approach can itself be described as proceduralist:
Protection of the private sphere insured that social relations were legitimate to the extent that
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Reflecting an ideology centrally organized around a sharp dichotomy
between the public and the private, the Lochner result could be seen as neutral, determinate, and apolitical to the extent the judiciary was simply protecting a private sphere of freedom from governmental regulation. Much
of the legal realist work was taken up in debunking the core libertarian
assumption that, without legislative regulation, the economic marketplace
could be truly private and free from governmental regulation. While the
libertarian thinkers of the Lochner era assumed that the common-law rules
of contract, property, and tort provided a set of neutral background rules
that merely facilitated individual transactions in the marketplace, the realists showed that each doctrinal rule could be seen as a policy decision made
by judges, a policy decision between, say, the competing claims of freedom
and security.' 9 Nothing in the idea of voluntariness or a free marketplace,
for example, dictated how to define fraud; the choice between a caveat
emptor privilege (expanding the freedom of sellers) and a full-disclosure
duty (expanding the security of buyers) depended on a policy judgment
that itself had distributive consequences. 0 Accordingly, the common-law
rules as to what constitutes fraud, coercion, competence, a compensable
tortious injury, an actionable nuisance, and the like were not simply
neutral ground rules of the marketplace, but served to establish a particular series of regulations, particular sets of policy decisions, none of
which could be neutrally deduced from the concept of free will or a private
sphere, and each of which could be seen to benefit some and burden
others. A broad disclosure duty benefits the gullible, the ignorant, and the
buyers; a narrow disclosure rule benefits the skeptical, the sophisticated,
they were the result of a process of individual choice. By describing the approach as embodying
a substantive conception of social justice, we mean to focus attention on the manner in which,
in the Lochner-era approach, the Court saw itself protecting a sphere of social relations (the
private) from encroachment by the government (the public) because of deep-seated principles of
justice and freedom rather than any idea that the procedures of legislation were not functionally
suited to regulating such relations. Conversely, it is not that process thinkers do not believe in
the suitability of "private ordering" for some types of social issues. See HART & SACKS, supra
note 3, at 207-365. Instead, the rationale for allocating particular decisions to private actors is,
in proceduralist discourse, the functional superiority of the "private ordering" process for regulating those domains, not the idea that justice and human freedom require it.
19. This summary of the realist critique follows Duncan Kennedy's description. See generally Duncan Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1685,

1710-13 (1976).
20.

See generally MORTON J. HOROWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW,

1870-1960: THE CRISIS OF LEGAL ORTHODOXY (1992) ; Duncan Kennedy, Distributive and
PaternalisticMotives in Contract and Tort Law, with Special Reference to Compulsory Terms and
Unequal Bargaining Power, 41 MD. L. REV. 563 (1982); Gary Pellet, The Metaphysics of American

Law, 73 CALIF. L. REV. 1151 (1985); Joseph William Singer, The Legal Rights Debate in Analytical
jurisprudencefrom Bentham to Hohfeld, 1982 WIS. L. REV. 975.
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the seller. Recognizing a tort of sexual harassment would benefit women
at the expense of harassers; failing to protect such an interest creates a
privilege on the part of harassers to injure without having to pay compensation. In each doctrinal area, some rule must be chosen, and the choice
will have distributive consequences in constructing the relative power and
wealth of market actors.
The realists uncovered how the common-law baseline, which
grounded the libertarian defense of private market ordering from the intrusion of public policy decisions, was itself constituted through policy decisions. Their critique revealed that the so-called private choice exercised
in a putatively free sphere was necessarily already regulated by public
power. The common-law construction of the baseline reflects the manner
in which so-called private choice is necessarily already regulated by public
power. Accordingly, to permit legislatures rather than common-law judges
to set those necessarily regulative baselines would not introduce regulation,
but instead substitute one set of policy decisions for another. Conversely,
realists also argued that even when the legislature had not explicitly
regulated in a particular area, the marks of public power nevertheless could
be found. Legislative inaction also effectuated a policy decision.
These abstract elements of the realist critique were captured in two
Supreme Court opinions that exemplify the victory of realist over libertarian analytics. Shelley v. Kramer,' finding state action in the common-law
enforcement of privately chosen contractual terms, embodies the realist
point that the power of private parties to contract depends on public
enforcement by the state, whether through legislative or common-law rules
giving effect to their contractually chosen terms." Reading Shelley broadly,
there can be no true private sphere separate from social power because all
so-called private action occurs in the bargaining context of public rules and
ultimately depends upon the willingness of public authorities to give them
effect. In Miller v. Schoene,"3 the Court rejected a just compensation claim
for losses occasioned by legislative requirements that cedar trees in close
proximity to apple trees be destroyed to prevent harm to the apple trees
caused by spores transported from cedar to apple trees.24 The Court reasoned that a policy judgment as to the relative importance of cedar and
apple trees would be embodied even in the absence of such legislation."
21. 334 U.S. 1 (1948).
22. See id.
23. 276 U.S. 272 (1928).
24.

See id. at 280-81.

25. See id. at 279-80.
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Had the legislature not acted, the relations between cedar and apple owners would be regulated in the form of a privilege on the part of the cedar tree
owner to cause harm to the apple tree owner without having to pay compensation. Either legislative action or legislative inaction would benefit
one side and hurt the other; there was no neutral basis to choose between
the alternatives in order to require compensation in one scenario and not
the other-and no baseline from which to identify a prior, prepolitical
right to private property that would be violated if no compensation is provided for the losses caused by legislative regulation.
As an analytic and ideological matter, the realist demonstration of the
incoherence of the laissez-faire image of a free economic marketplace
delegitimated the liberty of contract constitutional interpretation by
identifying the market as publicly constituted by a series of policy decisions
embodied, in the absence of legislation, in the constituitive common-law
rules. Accordingly, if policy was at issue, the realists argued, it was illegitimate-and antidemocratic-for the Court to strike down the democratic
policy decisions reflected in legislation.
The realist slogan that "law is politics" reflects not only the realist
debunking of the pretensions to objectivity and determinacy in judging,
but also this particular analytic deconstruction of libertarianism as a substantive theory of social justice, legal neutrality, and constitutional
interpretation. The legal process school of American jurisprudence should
be understood in the historical context of the crisis of legal legitimacy that
realism both reflected and engendered. The realists effectively debunked
the analytic rationale for reading the Constitution (and the common law)
through a libertarian framework. The problem was that, if all such legal
decisions were really political at base, there seemed to be no particularly
legal way of resolving them, and thus no basis for legitimate judicial action
at all.
The dramatic rise of proceduralism in twentieth-century legal thought
should be understood in the context of this particular intellectual quandary. Against more radical alternative conclusions-that law is necessarily
politics by other means, and thus the designation, as "law" must be understood to be an ideological sham to make appear as necessary and objective
social policies that were in fact contingent and political-proceduralists
attempt to resurrect a law/politics distinction by drawing a new demarcation between process and substance: Substantive decisions are necessarily
policy, as the realists demonstrated, but decisions about procedure, about
whether a particular decision was reached according to appropriate decisions, are susceptible to a legal analysis. Given the emphasis on the match
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between a particular kind of question and procedures for its resolution,
process theories are characterized by a focus on the "competence" of
various institutions to decide various kinds of issues. And thus, at the
constitutional level, process theory suggests a focus on the particular
competence of the legislature and the judiciary to decide particular kinds of

social issues.
The Early Politics of Proceduralism

D.

At its inception, process theory seemed unproblematically progressive.
Process theory legitimized the notion of an activist judiciary expanding and
transforming the common law according to formerly verboten considerations of social policy by framing such lawmaking as interstitial. In this
view, the judiciary was a deputy legislature, inevitably making law according to a loosely defined "reasoned elaboration" 6 of preexisting principles
and policies. The acknowledgment of the inevitable place of policy in legal
decision making was connected with the rise of an "activist" common-law
judiciary reforming tort and contract by developing the law of products
liability and promissory estoppel, for example. Judicial activism of this sort
was deemed legitimate under democratic principles because the legislature
could always reverse the common-law decisions of the judiciary if it went
too far afield. Simultaneously, the proceduralist premise that the legitimacy of all institutions rested ultimately on democratic will sustained the
repudiation of the Lochner Court's conservative activism.
Yet the ability of process theory to both legitimize new deal activism
and to sustain the realist assault on Lochner, all under the rubric of fidelity
to the democratic process, was linked to its impotence when confronting
constitutional challenges to legislation. As a consequence, when the legislation under consideration was politically progressive, then deference to
the legislature suggested by the counter-majoritarian difficulty produced
liberal results, i.e., progressive legislation was upheld. But when the legislation under consideration effected censorship and racial segregation, process theory's call for judicial restraint in the absence of so-called neutral
principles worked to render such policies immune to legal challenge.
The problem of course was that the democratic character of legislatures tended to be uncritically presumed. Discourse about the countermajoritarian difficulty and the passive virtues presumed that judicial review
need be carefully limited because it was an exception to the general commitment to democratic self-governance. This commitment to the exis26.

HART & SACKS, supra note 3, at 165-68.
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tence of democratic self-governance was critical: Not only was the
legitimacy of all American legal institutions premised on it, but it also constituted a core idea that distinguished the United States from the European
dictatorships that the allies opposed in the War.
For example, in Dennis v. United States, 7 Justice Frankfurter wrote
a classic process-oriented concurring opinion upholding the convictions of
Communists on the ground that their politically subversive speech constituted a sufficient threat to national security so as not to be protected
under the First Amendment. 8 He wrote separately, however, to put his
conclusion in terms of institutional competence. While the majority
simply applied the clear and present danger test and deferred to the lower
courts' "factual" conclusions regarding the imminence of the danger posed
by the worldwide communist conspiracy, Frankfurter focused on the
,respective institutional characteristics of the legislature and the judiciary to
conclude that the issues presented by the case were better suited to legislative resolution. 9 Given the uncontroversial premise that the legislature
must have the power to protect constitutional government from armed
overthrow, it required no great leap of logic to reason that whether a
worldwide communist conspiracy really posed a serious threat-and then
whether subversive communist speech could lead imminently to that
threat-were questions of factual investigation and evaluative judgment.
But the investigation and evaluation of a worldwide political, military, and
ideological situation with respect to threats of Communism were precisely
the types of determinations that the legislature and not the judiciary was
competent to make. The judiciary, itself unable to make findings as to
such global issues, must defer to legislative determinations of the risk that
subversive groups posed to the government, and thus, according to Justice
Frankfurter, the First Amendment did not prevent Congress from "finding"
an imminent threat of communist subversion warranting the prohibition of
communist/revolutionary speech.
Similarly, in his famous Neutral Principles lectures, 0 Herbert Weschler
agonized over the legitimacy of the Brown decision. Although he harbored no sympathy for segregation, Weschler simply could not identify any
neutral principle that would distinguish between the rights of black schoolchildren to associate and the rights of white school children not to.
Because he thought that democratic legislatures must be deferred to unless
27.
28

341 U.S. 494 (1951).
See id. at 517, 524-25 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).

29. See id. at 539-40.
30. See supra note 14.
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some neutral principle demanded otherwise, Weschler concluded that the
judiciary was institutionally incompetent to overrule legislative policy
regarding racial segregation. Of course, Weschler's premise that segregation presented competing associational rights between black and white
school children is by any measure an amazingly myopic view of a policy
that was grossly asymmetrical both in its origins and purposes. Weschler's
rendering of segregation was Plessy-like in its denial of the meaning, context, and function of segregation. Of course Weschler was personally aware
of the distinctively asymmetrical nature of segregation, yet this knowledge could not translate into a legitimate basis for judicial intervention.
The extent, nature, and degree of segregation was a substantive matter that
the judiciary, lacking democratic legitimacy, was ill-equipped to assess.
Neither Weschler nor Frankfurter con sidered in any way the possibility that the legislature that banned subversive agitation in Dennis or that
disenfranchised blacks in Brown was not democratic but rather the result
of a grossly undemocratic set of social arrangements. The combination of
Weschler's inability to rationalize Brown and Frankfurter's judicious
sanctioning of red-baiting in Dennis might have been expected to make
process-oriented constitutional theory unattractive to progressive-minded
theorists. However, it very quickly turned out that the very proceduralism
that seemed to suggest no judicially-enforced constitutional limitation to
censorship or apartheid could be, ingeniously, turned around to ban
censorship and apartheid. As we suggest below, Eule's work is properly
understood as part of this progressive version of process constitutional
theory in which the approach becomes identified with the Warren Court's
activism in civil rights, free speech, and the protection of the rights of
criminal defendants.
E.

The Progressive Reform of Process Theory in Constitutional Law

When the legislation under consideration was politically progressive, the deference to the legislature suggested by the counter-majoritarian
difficulty, the passive virtues, and the need to rule through neutral principles, produced liberal results, i.e., progressive legislation was upheld. But
when the legislation under consideration effected censorship and racial
segregation, process theory's call for judicial restraint left such policies
immune from legal challenge, and thus process theory played a conservative political role.
The transformation of process-orientation from
Frankfurter and Wechsler to Ely and Eule can be traced by the manner in
which the democratic character of the legislature is identified in each
approach. Rather than simply presume the democratic character of the
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legislature, the Warren Court can be seen to have carved out a set of topics
for critical judicial review gleaned from the premises of the countermajoritarian difficulty itself. This interpretation" is both a result of Ely's
grafting a coherent, worked-out theory onto Warren Court decisions, and,
we think, simultaneously descriptive of the mind set of liberal judges
themselves from the late fifties and through the seventies. Eule takes the
refinement of the process analytic one step further by more critically
examining the particular democratic character of representative institutions as compared to direct democracy alternatives, and by providing a
way to read the processes of legislation as reinforcing core democratic
commitments.
Simply stated, the original process-oriented notion, exemplified by
Frankfurter and Wechsler, demanded deference to the legislature in light of
its democratic character. Because, as the realists showed, substantive legal
issues invariably depended for their resolution on political judgments not
capable of neutral, legal resolution, the judiciary was competent to decide
such issues only interstitially when the legislature has not acted, and must
defer when the legislature has addressed a specific policy question. From
the limitation of the judiciary to decide only according to apolitical considerations, one could infer the competence of the legislature to decide
according to democratic procedures-the appropriate means of resolving
social issues not capable of resolution according to neutral principles. Yet
no inquiry was ever made as to whether this inference was in fact supportable. Early proceduralists based their deference on a simple finding that
the issue presented for judicial review should be resolved according to
democratic procedures, not whether the procedures in place were in fact
democratic.
The turn made by the Warren Court, as interpreted by Ely, was to
conclude that, if the basis for deference to the legislature is its democratic
character, such deference is inappropriate when the legislature calls its own
democratic character into question (by burdening free speech or voting
rights), or when it legislates about the interests of groups that majoritarian
democracy is poorly structured to consider, such as the interests of discrete
and insular minorities. The very reason for restraint in general justified
activist and critical review in these exceptional, categorical areas. Thus,
virtually the entire corpus of Warren Court liberalism could be recast and
legitimated as rulings designed to ensure rather than limit democratic selfdetermination. The judiciary could rule in its specific area of institutional
competence-the review of processes of decision making rather than the
31.

For a further discussion of this interpretation, see ELY, supra note 15.
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substance of policy judgments-and simultaneously comply with the
notion that substantive policy issues should be decided by democratic
means. This was an ingenious solution to the tendency of process theory
uncritically to defer to legislation, whatever its content. It also seems to
explain the predominance of Warren Court activism specifically in the
areas of criminal procedure, voting, free speech, and the protection of
minority interests, and the corresponding failure of the Court to read the
32
Constitution to provide substantive requirements.

II.

THE CONTRADICTIONS OF THE PROCEDURALIST ANALYTIC

We believe that the liberal reform of process theory helped make
it easier to conceive and reach some important doctrinal developments in
constitutional law-the judicial regulation of electoral districting to prevent racial exclusion, for example, or the Warren Court's protection of free
speech rights, or the banning of overt discrimination against African
Americans and other racial minorities. In short, we honor the contributions that this way of talking about social justice has made to improve the
status of many disempowered groups. But we also think that it is important
to understand that process discourse constitutes an ideology about the social
world. The notion that discourse about procedural rather-than substantive
issues is somehow particularly legal is false; the rational appeal of the process approach depends on suppressing the very realist analytics that
impugned the neutrality of substantive libertarianism as a way to interpret
the Constitution.
In general, the problem of process theory revealed by its historical
development is simple: There is no way to make procedural determinations separate from the very substantive decisions that a focus on
procedures is designed to avoid. To put this another way, process theory
cannot escape from the baseline problem that the realists exposed in the
32. The progressive Ely/Warren Court spin has defined the mainstream of process theory for
some two decades. To be sure, there has simultaneously existed a conservative counterinterpre-

tation of the proceduralist turn: Robert Bork, for example, utilized a process-oriented analytic
frame to argue for narrowed judicial review in constitutional law. See ROBERT H. BORK, THE
TEMPTING OF AMERICA (1990); Robert H. Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment
Problems, 47 IND. L.J. 1 (1971). In the sixties, Paul Bator took the same tack in the delineation
of a narrow scope of federal court jurisdiction. See Paul Bator, Finality in Criminal Law and
FederalHabeas Corpus for State Prisoners,76 HARV. L. REV. 441, 456-57 (1963). Conservative

process theory, however, has remained something of a countertext to the mainstream liberal
consensus.

33. For a contrasting critique of process theory, see Laurence H. Tribe, The Puzzling Persistance of Process-BasedConstitutional Theories, 89 YALE L.J. 1063 (1980).
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liberty of contract approach. Just as judges applying a liberty of contract
approach had to identify free contractual choice to defer to the private
marketplace, so process-oriented judges must identify legitimate democratic
self-determination before deferring to electoral marketplaces. And just as
the liberty of contract approach represented the economic marketplace as
private by suppressing the manner in which the baseline rules constructed
the power relations of the market, so constitutional process theorists
purport to protect an unregulated democratic marketplace by suppressing
the manner in which baseline rules construct the power relations of the
political marketplace. The more formalist the process identification of
democracy, the more the process approach satisfies the limitations on
judicial discretion at the cost of the convincingness of its conclusions; the
more functionalist the process inquiry, the more process theorists must
make decisions about the very controversial substantive decisions that only
the democratic process is supposed to resolve.
This problem of process theory is easiest to see in the contrast
between the Frankfurter/Wechsler approach and the Ely/Eule approach. In
the early process approach, Frankfurter and Wechsler analyzed the kind
of question presented and compared it to the particular institutional
competence of the judiciary. Once they identified that policy or value
judgments were necessary to the resolution of a particular issue, they
automatically concluded that the judiciary must defer because, given its
lack of democratic legitimacy, the issue was beyond its competence. The
circularity of this approach seems obvious in historical retrospect: The
judiciary's lack of democratic legitimacy at the base of the need for
restraint was only relevant when compared with the democratic legitimacy
of the legislature. If the legislature itself was undemocratic, however, there
was no predicate for the judiciary to defer to the legislature. The
Frankfurter/Wechsler style of process theory never faced this possibility; it
was avoided by simply presuming that the legislature was democratic.
The Frankfurter/Wechsler deference to the legislature is the formalist
pole of the continuum of ways to identify democracy. Rather than asking
anything about the quality of life, power relations, or even the legal rules
governing the electoral market, Frankfurter and Wechsler apparently
identified democracy with whatever an institution formally designated as
a "legislature" produced. Their approach to the identification of the
democratic character of the legislature was akin to a formalist definition
of contractual consent: One could identify consent wholly from formal, external signs (like the signature on the contract), or, as the realists
showed, one could do a functional, empirical analysis that evaluated the
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meaningfulness of choices made in the actual context of the economic
transaction. Similarl;', one could identify democracy formally (through the
identification of specific acts made by "duly constituted legislative
representatives") or one could identify democracy functionally (through a
substantive evaluation of the actual conditions of decision making). Given
that nothing within the theory itself dictated the formalist or functionalist
approach, it is rather amazing that Frankfurter proposed to defer to the
democratic character of a legislature that was engaged in censoring
dissident views, and that Wechsler argued the superiority of a democratic
process that excluded African Americans. A deep suppression of social
reality was required for these supposedly leading intellectuals to engage in
such formalist nonsense.
The Ely/Eule brand of process theory partly responds to the formalism
of the Frankfurter/Wechsler approach by establishing prerequisites to the
conclusion that the legislature is democratic and therefore worthy of deference. This refined version of process theory recognizes the illegitimacy of
simply presuming the democratic character of the legislature in defining
the appropriate scope of judicial review. Instead, the Ely/Eule tradition
adds critical bite to the process approach by giving content to the concept
of democracy. They associate democracy with free speech rights, rights
relating to fair elections, and the like; they also identify the structural
shortcomings of the majoritarian electoral process in properly considering
the interests of minorities and thus require searching judicial scrutiny of
laws burdening discrete and insular minorities.
There is no doubt that this liberal refinement of process theory is a
vast improvement in requiring at least some critical analysis of whether the
legislature is in fact democratic and therefore worthy of deference. The
problem is that, as soon as the possibility of critically reviewing the legislature's democratic character is opened up, it is difficult to contain. First, the
selection of free speech and fair electoral processes are not self-evident as
the only ways that democracy could be defined. The selection of some set
of characteristics as opposed to others (an election process not dependent
on funding from the wealthy would hardly seem to constitute a radical way
to define democracy) that could have been chosen represents a controversial policy judgment at the heart of the approach whose legitimacy is supposed to rest on the ability to limit "law" to uncontroversial judgments
about procedures. Second, even if there were consensus that these characteristics, and no others, are the signifiers of a democratic process, there is
still the problem of determining when such rights have been burdened.
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As we see it, the very same contradictions that the realists identified
in the liberty of contract approach to constitutional law also characterize
process theory. Like the freezing of the common-law rules of property, contract, and tort as a prepolitical, natural baseline, process theory assumes
that status quo social reality forms a neutral baseline from which to evaluate if democracy exists. Similarly, like the fallacious distinction between
legislative action and inaction in the Lochner era, the process approach can
only contain its critical inquiry by limiting it to the review of legislative
action and assuming that legislative inaction leaves the political marketplace unregulated.
To clarify this idea, consider the example of free speech rights.
Assuming that the existence of free speech, for example, is a noncontroversial precondition to democratic governance, the issue becomes how
to identify whether people are in fact free to speak out on public issues.
One way to identify whether free speech rights exist is to have the judiciary
scan the social universe and determine whether people actually,
functionally, have the ability to express themselves meaningfully on
political issues affecting the polity. At the other extreme, one could simply
presume that sufficient free speech exists so long as the government has not
affirmatively burdened such rights. The first approach might be termed
functional, realist, and de facto. The second should be recognizable as a
formal, prerealist, and de jure model. Nothing within the terms of process
theory dictates which approach to utilize. Either approach is problematic
for process theorists.
To the extent that process theorists simply presume the existence of
free speech rights unless the legislature has acted to burden them, they
respect the limitations on the institutional competence of the judiciary
(not to make controversial value judgments), but fail to demonstrate the
basis for deference to the legislature-the same formalist problem of the
Frankfurter/Wechsler approach. On the other hand, a functional, realist
inquiry into the real-world enjoyment of free speech rights provides a more
convincing basis for the ultimate conclusion that free speech rights exist,
but at the cost of judicial legitimacy because such an approach would
require making controversial value judgments about the distribution of
power in society. For example, does the formal right to speak out in a public park make fair, in any meaningful sense, the wildly different relative
power that the wealthy and the poor have to influence fellow citizens about
political issues? Does the social construction of hierarchies and boundaries
of gender, race, sexuality, and class first need reform before fair democratic
decison making takes place? Is so, who will run the deprogramming cen-
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ters? One extreme protects judicial legitimacy by limiting the inquiry to a
formalist evaluation; the other approach promises a real world evaluation
with no legitimacy for the judiciary to be conducting the inquiry. And
there is no way out of this quandary. It simply reflects the fact that the
realist critique was not transcended, but only suppressed, in the process
approach.
This tension between the poles of formal and functional ways to
evaluate democracy define the characteristic doctrinal dilemmas of process
theory. For example, the choices between de jure and de facto ways to
identify when the interests of minorities have been burdened-triggering
the stricter review under process theory-has marked the development of
equal protection doctrine over the last several decades.34 The de jure
approach is reflected in cases like Washington v. Davis, which limits constitutional review of racial discrimination to cases in which the legislature
intended to burden minorities. 35 'The approach assumes that, if the legislature has not intended to burden minorities, they have not been burdened
in a constitutionally meaningful sense. But just as the Schoene Court
understood that the failure to regulate cedar tree owners would in effect
establish a regulation burdening apple tree owners,36 so the de jure
approach can be seen to be prerealist because it fails to recognize that legislative inaction-say the failure to protect minorities--establishes a legal
privilege to harm minorities without having to pay compensation. From a
sophisticated, realist perspective, there is no way analytically to distinguish
legislative action from inaction without falsely assuming that the status quo
is prepolitical and accordingly a neutral baseline. When process theorists
honor the state action doctrine and accordingly limit constitutional review
to affirmative governmental acts, they implicitly assume that minorities are
not burdened in the status quo or, in the First Amendment context, that
free speech rights are not burdened, just as Lochner-era judges assumed that
the private sphere was free from regulation so long as the legislature had
not acted. Taking Schoene and Shelley seriously means recognizing the mistake of assuming that a realm is free from regulation in the absence of
explicit legislation.
As we noted above, just as the ideas of voluntariness and free will
never dictated the particular fraud and duress rules of the late nineteenth
34. For a more in depth analysis of the conflict between de jure and de facto equal protection doctrine, see Kimber6 Williams Crenshaw, Race, Reform and Retrenchment: Transformation
and Legitimationin Antidiscrimination Law, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1331 (1988).
35. See Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 239-41 (1976).
36. See Miller v. Schoene, 276 U.S. 272, 278-79 (1928).
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century, nothing in the idea of democracy, free speech, or the protection of
minorities demands that process theory be conducted in a formalist rather
than functionalist manner. In fact, a de facto approach has, on limited
occasion, been pursued. The Warren Court followed a de facto approach
in many of the school desegregation cases-requiring affirmative governmental steps to be taken to achieve integration rather than simply requiring that the government stop acting nonneutraly with respect to race, even
though, from a de jure perspective, the legislature did not act to produce
the segregation it was ordered to remedy.37 Similarly, some free speech,"
religion, voting,4 and travel 4' cases also demonstrate that a functionalist,
de facto approach is possible. But those cases appear today exceptional and
countertextual. In fact, as a historical matter, the process approach has
always been heavily tilted toward the formal approach. This bias, while
analytically indefensible, is historically explicable in terms of the
approach's main preoccupation with the post-Lochner legitimacy of judicial
decision making. The problem with the functional, de facto approach is
that it obviously requires the kinds of controversial judgments that the
judiciary is unable to render under the institutional competence terms
of process orientation; the problem with the de facto approach is that it
avoids such value judgments by assuming without justification the normative status of the status quo, whatever the status quo might be. And the
37. See, e.g., Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1, 413 U.S. 189 (1973) (ruling that after plaintiffs
show segregative policies affecting part of a school district, the burden shifts to defendants
to demonstrate that the entire district was not affected); Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd.
of Educ., 402 U.S. 1 (1971) (conferring upon courts broad equitable power to remedy school
segregation, including shifting the burden to school authorities to demonstrate that a school's
racial composition is not the result of discrimination); Green v. County School Bd., 391 U.S.
430 (1968) (striking down a freedom of choice desegregation plan, the Court held that once a
school district had official segregative policies, simply ceasing those policies was held insufficient
to remedy constitutional violations).
38. See, e.g., Amalgamated Food Employees Union v. Logan Valley Plaza, Inc., 391 U.S.
308 (1968) (requiring a privately owned shopping mall to provide access to protesters because
the private owner exercises power that is similar to that of the government); New York Times
Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964) (holding that a common-law defamation remedy constitutes state action subject to First Amendment review).
39. See, e.g., Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963) (holding that the denial of unemployment compensation to a Saturday Sabbath observer burdened her free exercise of religion
because as a functional matter, her economic needs for unemployment compensation forced her
to comply with government requirements).
40. See, e.g., Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966) (invalidating poll
taxes); Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461 (1953) (ruling that segregation by private political club
violated the Constitution because of the functional power that clubs had over formal elections).
41. See, e.g., Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969) (refusing to allow states to deny
welfare benefits to new residents because such denial would interfere with their right to interstate
travel).
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ultimate circularity of the process approach consists of the fact that a

meaningful inquiry into whether to defer to the legislature because of its
democratic character requires the kinds of controversial value judgments
that only the legislature itself is competent to make under the terms of
process theory. Ironically, this state of affairs is kept from view in contemporary versions of process theory by adopting as its own the vision of state
action that the realists so thoroughly debunked in its deconstruction of the
liberty of contract approach to constitutional law.
Of course, it is true that taking Shelley and Schoene and the rest of the
realist analytic seriously would mean abandoning the state action doctrine
as a limitation on the reach of constitutional restrictions, a doctrinal turn
that would have dramatic and far-reaching consequences. But the state
action doctrine has no intellectual, rational justification once the libertarian assumptions of the Lochner era have been rejected. If the realist analytics are right-and as far as we know, they have never been challenged
as analytically unsound-there is no reason to assume that the only significant form of collective power that could burden free speech rights or
minority interests is affirmative legislative action-rather than, say, the
legally protected privileges of private parties to restrict the actual, empirical freedom of individuals.
Despite its intellectual incoherence, however, no process theorist has
ever proposed abandoning the state action limitation on judicial review.
Ely, Eule, and the rest all construct their theories with the state action doctrine as an assumed part of the theoretical landscape. Understanding that
the retention of the state action doctrine provides a useful window into
explaining why, despite the analytic possibility of process theory being
conducted in a functional, de facto manner, there is a recognizable tilt in
process theory to the formalist pole of possible approaches.
Were the state action limitation to be abandoned, the judicial review
role would not be restricted to review of legislation, popular initiative,
orother affirmative lawmaking. Rather, given the judiciary's role within
the terms of process theory to ensure the democratic legitimacy of lawmaking, the judiciary would be required to evaluate the entire social field
to determine if the extent conditions were consistent with democratic selfdetermination, before any affirmative lawmaking at all. It would have to
resolve questions such as whether democracy is consistent with the
maldistribution of wealth in American society; whether a free marketplace
of ideas could exist given the ways that ownership of effective means of
communication is established; whether the reality of the election process
exclusion of all but the wealthiest is consistent with democracy; whether
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the widespread sexual objectification of women prevents their meaningful
participation in the political process; or whether the lack of health care
prevents large groups of people from meaningful participation. In other
words, the very controversial issues that can be resolved through
democratic legislation would have to be resolved by the judiciary itself
before any deference to the legislature would be in order. The ultimate
quandary is that, under the terms of process theory, the judiciary lacks
the institutional competence to decide the issues necessary for it to determine whether to defer to the legislature. Process theorists suppress this
contradiction by tilting their analysis to the formalist pole-by acting as if
the issues necessary to evaluate the democratic character of American
society happened all to be resolvable within the terms of neutral principles
and other ways to define the limits on judicial decision making. In short,
the otherwise inexplicable embrace of the state action doctrine and other
intellectually discredited elements of the old Lochner approach responds to
the process commitment to keep judicial decision making within the terms
set forth in process theory, regardless of its failure meaningfully to evaluate
democratic processes.
Along these lines, Justice White is intellectually correct when he
states in his Washington v. Davis opinion that pursuing a de facto approach
to identifying racial discrimination would lead to a slippery slope with no
stopping point: "[The de facto approach] would be far-reaching and would
raise serious questions about, and perhaps invalidate, a whole range of tax,
welfare, public service, regulatory, and licensing statutes that may be more
burdensome to the poor and to the average black than to the more affluent
white."42 White assumes that simply reciting these consequences is enough*
to impugn a de facto approach. He does not consider, however, the possibility that failure to pursue such enquiries may render formal and empty
the judicial protection of minorities, or of free speech rights. In the end,
then, the Ely/Eule approach is simply a dressed-up version of the
Frankfurter/Wechsler model. Ultimately, both approaches base deference
to a purportedly democratic process on the limits on judicial inquiry rather
than a meaningful evaluation of the process itself.
III.

PROCESS THEORY DISINTEGRATING: THE SUPREME COURT'S
REVIEW OF POPULAR INITIATIVES
We believe that the analysis we have set forward above points in a

direction that amplifies and extends Eule's demand for close scrutiny of
42. Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 248 (1976).
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direct democracy. Yet as we have emphasized above, the cost of this
extension might well entail the relinquishment of one of process theory's
most basic promises: to provide a jurisprudential method free of substantive
evaluation or, more directly, politics. The ground of this argument is found
in connecting the realist dimensions of Shelley and Schoene on the one
hand, and Reitman v. Mulkey" and Romer v. Evans4 on the other.
Just as Shelley and Schoene exemplify the subversive consequences of a
realist approach to the liberty of contract ideology, to our minds, Reitman
and Romer likewise exemplify the analytic circularity of the process
approach to constitutional law that we described above. In both Reitman
and Romer, the Supreme Court reviewed popular initiatives (actually state
constitutional amendments enacted through popular referenda) that purported to withdraw antidiscrimination protection.
In Reitman, the Court struck down a constitutional amendment preventing the enactment in California of fair housing laws banning racial
discrimination.45 Clearly, as the Court noted, there was as an initial matter
no constitutional duty to adopt such antidiscrimination provisions.46 One
would suppose, consequently, that there would be no constitutional prohibition against the repeal of such legislation after it had been adopted. In its
ruling, however, the Court held that the repeal of the fair housing laws
worked to encourage private housing discrimination, and thus violated the
Equal Protection Clause. In a similar ruling, the Romer Court struck down
a state constitutional amendment adopted through popular referendum
that would have forbidden granting "special rights" against discrimination
on the basis of sexual orientation. While there was no constitutional duty
to protect gays and lesbians against discrimination in the first instance, the
Court held that it violated the Constitution to single out homosexuals and
refuse to protect them against discrimination.48
As we see it, Reitman and Romer are analogous to Shelley and Schoene
in that they demonstrate the inability analytically to fix a neutral baseline
from which to evaluate an illegitimate democratic process in the same ways
that Shelley and Schoene demonstrated the lack of a neutral economic base49
line from which to identify the intervention of economic regulation. For
43. 387 U.S. 369 (1967).
44.

517 U.S. 620 (1996).

45.
46.
47.
48.
49.

See Reitman, 387 U.S. at 380.
See id.at 374-75.
See Romer, 517 U.S. at 635.
See id. at 630-31,634-35.
For a discussion of these baseline issues as they arise in Reitman, see Kenneth L. Karst,

Citizenship, Race, and Marginality, 30 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1 (1988). For a discussion of these
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example, in Reitman, the Court in one sense merely applied the general
equal protection rule that the government may not assist private parties in
discriminating against minorities. The ruling, however, immediately raises
a problem with the limits of its logic. It is true that the Court based its
ruling in part on an analysis of the specific political climate of California at
the time, concluding that, as a real-world empirical matter, the "ultimate
impact"" of the repeal would be to encourage and embolden racial discrimination by private parties.
But Reitman opens up possibilities even more far reaching than the
adoption of a functionalist rather than formal review. If, as the Court reasoned, the effect of the repeal would be to encourage discrimination,'
there is no reason to condemn a state's failure to pass antidiscrimination
legislation in the first instance if the actual impact of such a failure would
be to encourage discrimination. In other words, just as the realists showed
that the government's failure to act-say to protect apple trees from cedar
trees, or to recognize a tort against sexual harassment-has an effect on the
distribution of social power in the economic marketplace, so the government's failure to act in the political marketplace can be seen to effect a
particular distribution of power. To the extent the government fails to act
to protect minorities from discrimination, it privileges discriminators at the
expense of victims of discrimination; to the extent that the government
fails to act to require media outlets to permit nonpaying public speech, it
privileges such parties to restrict the free speech opportunities of nonowners. Either way, public power is necessarily at stake and manifest in the
creation of rights against harm or privileges to harm. Once the repeal of
antidiscrimination legislation is recognized as nonneutral governmental
action, there is no reason to treat the failure of the government to act at all
as neutral, as somehow respecting a baseline of rights, duties, and privileges
that is free from public power. In short, the government can no more avoid
responsibility for the distribution of power in the political marketplace
than it can in the economic marketplace."
baseline issues as they arise in Romer, see Louis Michael Seidman, Romer's Radicalism: The Unexpected Revival of Warren Court Activism, 1996 SuP. CT. REv. 67.
50. Reitman, 387 U.S. at 376.
51. See id. at 376, 380.
52. For this reason, whatever the merits of hate speech or antipornography legislation, we
think that it is incoherent to say that such legislation violates free speech rights. To the extent
that hate speech and pornography constitute harms to the ability of minorities or women to
exercise their own free speech rights, it is a zero sum situation: Refusing to ban hate speech and
pornography does not respecting an unregulated free speech market; rather, it creates legally protected privileges for such speakers to harm others. There is simply no neutral baseline possible;
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The Reitman Court's implicit treatment of the existence of fair housing measures as the baseline from which to evaluate the neutrality of'government action is made even more explicit in Romer. The defenders of the
Romer referendum-which would have banned any laws forbidding discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation-argued that by banning
antidiscrimination protection for sexual minorities, they were just returning to a neutral baseline in which no "special rights" would be granted
53
to sexual minorities over and above other citizens. In effect, all that the
referendum accomplished, according to its defenders, was to put sexual
minorities on the same plane as others, hardly a denial of equal protection
unless the Constitution required antidiscrimination protection, a premise
54
seemingly foreclosed by the decision in Bowers v. Hardwick. But in striking down the referendum as violative of equal protection, the Court
contended that sexual minorities were being singled out for a denial of
55
antidiscrimination protection that other citizens could obtain. In other
words, rather than define a baseline of no antidiscrimination protection,
with limited exceptions for specified groups, the Court treated the baseline
as consisting of general protection against discrimination. Accordingly,
the singling out of homosexuals for exclusion from that general baseline
constituted an irrational denial of a benefit based on animus toward sexual
minorities.

IV.

PROCESS THEORY DISINTEGRATING: THE SUPREME COURT'S
REVIEW OF POPULAR INITIATIVES

Just as Shelley and Schoene exemplify the subversive consequences of a
realist approach to the liberty of contract ideology, so, to our minds,
Reitman and Romer exemplify the analytic circularity of the process
approach to constitutional law that we described above. In both Reitman
and Romer, the Supreme Court reviewed popular initiatives (actually state
constitutional amendments enacted through popular referenda) that
purported to withdraw antidiscrimination protection.
In Reitman, the Court struck down a constitutional amendment preventing the enactment in California of fair housing laws banning racial
whichever rules are chosen will empower some and disempower others in the free speech
marketplace.
53. See Romer, 517 U.S. at 626.
54. 478 U.S. 186, 194-95 (1986). For an argument that Romer does not contradict the
holding in Bowers, see Cass R. Sunstein, The Supreme Court 1995 Term, Foreword: Leaving
Things Undecided,, 110 HARV. L. REV. 4 (1996).

55. See Romer, 517 U.S. at 635.

1708

145 UCLA LAw REvIEw 1683 (1998)

discrimination. Clearly, as the Court noted, there was as an initial matter
no constitutional duty to adopt such antidiscrimination provisions. One

would suppose, consequently, that there would be no constitutional prohibition against the repeal of such legislation after it had been adopted. In its
ruling, however, the Court held that the repeal of the fair housing laws
worked to encourage private housing discrimination, and thus violated the
Equal Protection Clause. In a similar ruling, the Romer Court struck down
a state constitutional amendment adopted through popular referendum
that would have forbidden granting "special rights" against discrimination
on the basis of sexual orientation. While there was no constitutional duty
to protect gays and lesbians against discrimination in the first instance, the
Court held that it violated the Constitution to single out homosexuals to
refuse to protect them against discrimination.
As we see it, Reitman and Romer are analogous to Shelley and Schoene
in that they demonstrate the inability analytically to fix a neutral baseline
from which to evaluate an illegitimate democratic process in the same ways
that Shelley and Schoene demonstrated the lack of a neutral economic baseline from which to identify the intervention of economic regulation. For
example, in Reitman, the Court in one sense merely applied the general
equal protection rule that the government may not assist private parties in
discriminating against minorities. The ruling, however, immediately raises
a problem with the limits of its logic. It is true that the Court based its
ruling in part on an analysis of the specific political climate of California
at the time, concluding that, as a real-world empirical matter, the "ultimate impact" of the repeal would be to encourage and embolden racial discrimination by private parties. But Reitman opens up possibilities even
more far reaching than the adoption of a functionalist rather than formal
review. If, as the' Court reasoned, the effect of the repeal would be to
encourage discrimination, there is no reason to decline to strike down a
state's failure to pass antidiscrimination legislation in the first instance if
the actual impact of such a failure would be to encourage discrimination.
In other words, just as the realists showed that the government's failure to
act-say to protect apple trees from cedar trees, or to recognize a tort
against sexual harassment-has an effect on the distribution of social
power in the economic marketplace, so the government's failure to act in
the political marketplace can be seen to effect a particular distribution of
power. To the extent the government fails to act to protect minorities
from discrimination, it privileges discriminators at the expense of victims
of discrimination; to the extent that the government fails to act to require
media outlets to permit nonpaying public speech, it privileges such parties
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to restrict the free speech opportunities of nonowners. Either way, public
power manifest in the creation of rights against harm or privileges to harm
is necessarily at stake. Once the repeal of antidiscrimination legislation is
recognized as nonneutral governmental action, there is no reason to treat
the failure of the government to act at all as neutral, as somehow
respecting a baseline of rights, duties, and privileges that is free from public
power. In short, the government can no more avoid responsibility for the
distribution of power in the marketplace of ideas of the political marketplace than it can in the economic marketplace. 6
The Reitman Court's implicit treatment of the existence of fair housing measures as the baseline from which to measure the neutrality of government action is made even more explicit in Romer. The defenders of the
Romer referendum-which would have banned any laws forbidding discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation-argued that by banning
antidiscrimination protection for sexual minorities, they were just returning to a neutral baseline in which no "special rights" would be granted
to sexual minorities over and above other citizens. In effect, all that the
referendum accomplished, according to its defenders, was to put sexual
minorities on the same plane as others, hardly a denial of equal protection
unless the Constitution required antidiscrimination protection, a premise
foreclosed by the decision in Bowers.
In striking down the referendum as violative of equal protection, the
Court contended that sexual minorities were being singled out for a denial
of antidiscrimination protection that other citizens could obtain. In other
words, rather than define a baseline of no antidiscrimination protection,
with limited exceptions for specified groups, the Court treated the baseline
as consisting of general protection against discrimination. Accordingly,
the singling out of homosexuals for exclusion from that general baseline
constituted an irrational denial of a benefit based on animus toward sexual
minorities.
The majority's construction of a baseline of general protection
against discrimination for everyone is based on an outright reversal of the
common-law construction. Under the old common law, a private party
56. For this reason, whatever the merits of hate speech or antipornography legislation, we

think that it is incoherent to say that such legislation violates free speech rights. To the extent

that hate speech and pornography constitute harms to the ability of minorities or women to
exercise their own free speech rights, it is a zero sum situation: Refusing to ban hate speech and
pornography does not respect an unregulated free speech market; rather, it creates legally protected privileges for such speakers to harm others. There is simply no neutral baseline possible;
whichever rules are chosen will empower some and disempower others in the free speech

marketplace.
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was privileged to discriminate on any ground whatsoever. An owner of
private property could, in general, exclude whomever he wished. An
employer could refuse to hire an individual for whatever reason. Everyone
was free to contract or not to contract on any basis whatsoever. 7 The
limiting principle to this general privilege was the public/private line. In
the limited and exceptional category of public actors, no discrimination
was permitted. In the nineteenth century, this realm consisted entirely of
innkeepers, smiths, common carriers, and public utilities. Without commenting on its reversal of this relation between rule and limiting principle,
the Romer majority treats the duty of public actors not to discriminate as if
it were the basic rule governing all actors, and the privilege to discriminate
as the limiting and exceptional principle for the category of truly private
relations. In the majority's construction of the baseline, everyone is protected against arbitrary discrimination. Particular groups, like racial or
sexual minorities, need explicit, categorical protection that others do not
need. Interestingly, the majority constructs this baseline by citing the Civil
Rights Cases 9 for the proposition that all individuals are protected under
common-law principles from discrimination, never acknowledging that this
6
was the exception, not the general rule, under the old common law. 0
The Romer decision is sophistry, but no more so than any other
manipulation of the baseline from which governmental action is evaluated.
Justice Scalia is right that, given the state's power to criminalize homosexual conduct upheld in Bowers, it is implausible to contend that there
is a constitutional duty to protect sexual minorities against discrimination.
Moreover, there is no constitutional duty for government to protect individuals against discrimination on various other bases: "[An] interviewer
may refuse to offer a job because the applicant is a Republican; because he
is an adulterer; because he went to the wrong prep school ...; because he
eats snails ... .,,6'
Accordingly, given a baseline of no protection against
discrimination, the Court's decision looks like special treatment for sexual
minorities. Scalia's charge is accurate that the majority is simply manipulating the baseline to make it appear that the referendum, rather than the
antidiscrimination laws granting protection to sexual minorities not available to others, constitutes nonneutral action to be reviewed. There is no
57.

See, e.g., Hurley v. Eddingfield, 59 N.E. 1058 (Ind. 1901) (holding that absent a con-

tractual agreement, a doctor is under no duty to treat a patient).
58. For a discussion of this common-law structure, see Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian, and Bisexual Group, 515 U.S. 557, 571 (1995).
59. 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
60. See Romer, 517 U.S. at 627-28.
61. Id. at 652-53 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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conceptual reason to treat the baseline as the majority does, i.e., that
everyone who needs protection against irrational discrimination is granted
it except that sexual minorities are carved out from those general laws by
the referendum. But Scalia is not "right" because there is no reason to
accept the old common-law baseline that Scalia proposes either. The
designation of neutrality, or special treatment, or affirmative action, all
depends on the baseline that one takes as the starting point. It is a more or
less ideological decision about how to describe the social and legal world, a
decision that is not restrained by any neutral, legal principles.
In these terms, Reitman and Romer look odd only because the baseline
usually is defined differently-in terms of the old, discredited liberty of
contract notion that any state of affairs existing before legislative action
is somehow conceptually and ontologically prior to the exercise of government power. Given the conservative baseline that process-oriented constitutionalism usually employs, these cases look "wrong." But as a conceptual
matter, it is possible to do a Reitman or Romer analysis anytime a judge
wants. Like Shelley and Schoene, Reitman and Romer demonstrate the utter
indeterminacy of constitutional discourse under a proceduralist analytic.

V.

EVALUATING PROCESS DISCOURSE IDEOLOGICALLY

Given the indeterminacy of the process "analytic," there is no reason
that it cannot be used to further either conservative or liberal results.
Romer brings this manipulability right out in the open. Eule's work on
popular initiatives is similarly revealing.
It is clear that Eule is sensitive to the dynamics of racial power in our
society. He may also be right that, in a legislative forum, the "deliberative"
environment is less conducive to racial acting out. But the argument is not
analytically convincing-in Romer terms, it's just Eule's "deliberative"
baseline instead of a baseline starting with popular majoritarian sovereignty. Eule's solution to the problem of racist and homophobic voting
majorities is ingenious-when faced with problematic instances of electoral
results, one can add a "republican" layer to the definition of democratic
process to justify negating the results of popular election.62 But his arguments also push the indeterminacy of process theories of constitutional law
62.

We find the republican notion of "deliberation" as a legitimating characteristic of legis-

lative action itself problematic; it assumes some neutral, acultural mode of rational discourse that
we don't think exists. See William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Gary Peller, The New Public Law Move-

ment: Moderation as a Postmodern CulturalForm, 89 MICH. L. REV. 707 (1991).
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to a whole new level-in addition to all the ways to argue that the legislature is unrepresentative, Eule offers a layer of ways to argue that, in effect,
the voters are not representative either. The analysis can go in just any
direction at all. ,
To the extent that a proceduralist approach is manipulable in these
ways, it can be utilized to achieve liberal or conservative results. But while
there is nothing analytically conservative about process-oriented constitutional approaches, the fact of the matter is that a functionalist, de facto
application of process theory always seems more "activist," interventionist,
and illegitimate. The reason is that, despite its indeterminate analytics,
proceduralism has historically played a conservative legal, political, and
cultural role.
A de facto deployment of process theory seems illegitimate because,
historically, process theory was constructed to relegitimate the judiciary
after the legal realist attack. Accordingly, a starting-point premise is that
there is in fact a neutral, apolitical way to resolve matters of substantive conflict. The applications of process theory in Reitman and Romer,
like the possibility of a de facto interpretation of equal protection that
Justice White found so troubling in Washington v. Davis, reveal that
nothing in the premises of process theory can legitimate a restrained
judiciary avoiding substantive decision making because the review of
process always involves at least an implicit decision on substantive fairness.
When process theory is applied in a de jure, restrained fashion, it seems
to have solved the problem of legitimating the judiciary by keeping its
actions within the realm of neutral questions about procedure; the problem
is that such legitimation rests on an indefensible assumption that the status
quo distribution of power, wealth, prestige, and privilege is consistent with
procedural fairness and therefore need not itself be reviewed. When
process theory is applied in a de facto, activist fashion, it avoids the
problem of assuming the normative status of existing conditions, but at the
cost of judicial legitimacy. Given the historical context within which
process theory was constructed-following the realist assault on the
law/politics distinction-it should not be surprising that process theory has
always been applied with a decidedly conservative tilt.
The problem is much deeper than that, however. Process theory in
constitutional law is inseparable from the rise of proceduralism in American culture more generally. Proceduralism is part of a general ideological
and cultural turn toward avoidance and suppression of social problems, a
subtle way of diffusing energy directed towards true social transformation.
Eule offers a useful way to try to get popular initiatives that harm racial
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or sexual minorities struck down, but it also strikes us as implausible to
think that the social issues reflected in Proposition 209 in California, for
example, are explicable in terms of a lack of deliberation.
Proposition 209 reflects a deep resentment of racial liberation, and
a deep embrace of an ideology of meritocracy that, like process theory

itself, takes as a baseline the existing ways that qualifications for jobs and
admittance to educational institutions are constructed. It reflects a de jure
view of race discrimination that constructs affirmative action as a special
privilege. Changing the ideological lens from a de jure to a de facto
perspective would make most "affirmative action" seem simply like a
garden-variety remedy for discrimination rather than a special handout.
Understanding what's going on in Proposition 209 means understanding
how the white working class has been manipulated to think it has an
investment in a social and economic structure that actually is based on the
subordination of workers in general and a definition of merit that
legitimates the low status of the very people who supported Proposition 209
most vehemently. It means understanding the ways that liberal and
progressives have themselves contributed to this backlash by demonizing
this group as "rednecks." It means understanding how constitutional
discourse itself-in defining race discrimination according to a de jure
model-has helped to construct and confirm an ideological discourse in
which the racial redistribution of resources looks like racial favoritism
rather than a relatively meager attempt to reverse centuries of
subordination. In short, it requires a complex political analysis to get at
how popular sovereignty such as that reflected in Proposition 209 might
embody antidemocratic assumptions and motivations. Such an analysis
would necessarily be controversial on many levels. But what is clear is that
the flaws of such acts of popular sovereignty are decidedly not captured by a
notion that the initiative failed to include a process of rationalistic
deliberation.
Similarly, the proceduralism of the Warren Court reflected an avoidance and suppression of the substantive conflicts underlying many of its
great cases. For example, the problem of economic disempowerment of
welfare recipients is avoided and suppressed in the Goldberg v. Kelly 63
approach granting welfare recipients hearings whenever their individual
benefits are reduced or eliminated. Poor people need money, jobs, day
care, and housing, not meaningless meetings in which they are symbolically "heard" but it can make no difference what they say. Proceduralism
has provided a way simply to avoid wrenching issues by appointing a
63. 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
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committee, having a hearing, deliberating-it has, in everyday life, become
a particularly insidious way of pretending that subordinated people actually
participated in setting the terms of our social life.
CONCLUSION

Process-oriented approaches to constitutional law, exemplified in
the work of Professor Julian Eule and other centrist constitutional scholars,
are analytically indeterminate. Proceduralism can be applied to achieve
either conservative or liberal results. Even when utilized by liberals like
Eule, however, proceduralism has a deeply conservative and apologetic
cast. The libertarianism of Lochner and other conservative cases of the turn
of the century also could be utilized for liberal results in individual caseswithin the central analytic of individual liberty, the Court could have
concluded that workers exercised no meaningful free will and thus
ameliorative labor legislation was permissible. But just as the discourse of
libertarianism served to obscure the social power manifest in the
purportedly private realm, so process theory obscures the substantive issues
implicit in procedural decisions. The distribution of wealth, power,
prestige, and privilege in American society presents inescapably political
issues. There is no way to avoid them simply through procedural
resolution. The notion that the basic terms of our social life are legitimate
because they are the result of an appropriate process for deciding such
issues-whether the legitimating process is electoral or deliberative-is
false.
We think that process theory at the constitutional level is connected
to proceduralist discourse in everyday institutional life. There are, very
occasionally, deeply democratic moments in our workplaces and schools
when people resist the routinization of everyday life and mobilize to
transform it. Such popular mobilization is often deeply democratic because
it embodies an aspiration for self-determination, for people deciding how
things should be right there, in the immediate moment, rather than simply
accepting the way things are. The culture of proceduralism meets these
very best-and most democratic-moments of our social lives with fear
and a will to discipline and defuse. When Norma Rae climbs atop the
machinery and leads a wildcat walkout from the shop floor, we are inspired
and root for her precisely because we share a deeply held aspiration for true
self-determination, for people getting together and struggling to gain control over everyday life. Appointing a committee to analyze the "problem"
and deliberate about solutions accordingly just misses the whole point
of how an authentic self-determination might be achieved. Understanding

Contradictionsof Mainstream ConstitutionalTheory

1715

that the choice at some level of life in America at the end of the twentieth
century is between wildcat strikes, runaway juries, and popular mobilization
on the one hand and reasoned deliberation through committee meetings
on the other, we reflexively feel a sense of solidarity with the wildcat
strikers and the runaway jurors, with those people who seize power to resist
the normalization of subordination. We want to multiply these moments
of communal connection and self-determination, not to reject them.
Of course, sometimes we think such moments serve repressive
ideologies-runaway juries can acquit Klan members on trial for bombing
black churches, and the authentic self-determination of a racist majority
can repress African Americans and others. And sometimes appointing a
committee to consider an institutional issue really does make sense and
does not constitute the suppression of the energy of people working in the
institution. But just as the liberatory character of moments of selfdetermination are not recognized in the proceduralist discourse, so a
proceduralist set of rules cannot systemically distinguish authentic and
liberatory popular mobilization from acts of social domination. No "legal"
discourse can because, in the end, identifying whether democracy exists
involves deeply political, ideological, and cultural analyses-just the kind
of inquiry that proceduralism systemically forecloses. Ultimately, then, we
find ourselves in an awkward relation to liberal process theorists such as
Eule or Ely. On particular and discrete issues we often agree, and we often
work together. But we also harbor a sense that the procedural discourse is
itself an impediment to human liberation because it consructs an ideology
that is suspicious of the very moments of passion and group struggle that we
find the most hopeful sign that things can dramatically change in
American society.

